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## **AUTHORITY ORIENTATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES:**

### **A TEST OF THE "ASIAN VALUES" HYPOTHESIS**

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## **Abstract**

Our research focuses on a central question for the nations of East Asia: how is the political culture of the region related to its democratic development? Political culture theory argues that the social authority relations in a society often influence the political regime choice of a nation. Consequently, much of the literature on East Asia emphasizes the importance of family, hierarchy, community, and traditional social authority relations as a consequence of Confucian cultural traditions, and asks whether these values are compatible with positive orientations toward democracy.

Drawing upon the newest wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), this article analyzes public opinion in China, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, as well as the established Pacific Rim democracies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. We begin by assessing orientations toward authority among these publics. Then we link these sentiments to support for democracy. The results contradict the core tenets of the Asian values literature, and offer a more positive view of the prospects for modernization in the region. In addition, the weak relationship between authority orientations and democratic attitudes raises questions about the congruence thesis that is a basic premise of political culture theory.

## **Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes in East Asia: A Test of the "Asian Values" Hypothesis**

Among the many explanations for the special course of political and economic development in East Asia, the theme of "Asian values" has played an especially prominent role. The Singaporean patriarch Lee Kuan Yew popularized the argument that Confucian values have had a distinct influence on East Asian development. He pointed to the authority orientations particular to Confucian culture, and different from those of the West, as explanations for a unique developmental pattern in East Asia (Lee 1994; Emmerson 1995). The Confucian tradition of respect for authority and the emphasis on community over individual rights were presented as antithetical to Western images of liberalism. In less polemic terms, this same principle has been an element of considerable scholarly research on East Asian political culture as well (Pye 1985; Scalapino 1989; Lau and Kuan 1988).

This proposition has been met with much criticism and debate. For democracy activists, the concept of "Asian values" is viewed as a roadblock to democratization in East Asia. Political elites may call upon Asian values in an effort to construct a false sense of unity in support of current non-democratic regimes. As we discuss below, other scholars ask whether such cultural traditions actually exist, and whether they are really inconsistent with democratic development.

Although the theme of Asian values has been debated on philosophical grounds, cross-national empirical findings on what citizens in East Asia actually believe has largely been lacking from this discussion. Therefore, the current research examines some of its underlying assumptions of the "Asian values" thesis and subjects them to an empirical test. Drawing upon new data from the 2000-02 World Values Survey, we first describe orientations toward authority in various social settings. Then we consider whether these orientations significantly affect

support for democracy among East Asians, with a comparison to Western publics. The findings give the publics of East Asia a voice in this debate on the content and consequences of Asian values and Confucian traditions, and provide evidence on the cultural conditions relevant to democratization in East Asia.

### **The Asian Values Debate**

The “Asian values” debate can be understood as the contention between different political cultures in the sense of Huntington’s clash of civilizations (1996). Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, democracy has become the dominant ideological option. Against this dominating ideology, many Third World countries are searching for their own position in the political space left open by the evaporation of the Communist bloc. More than ever, cultural identities are becoming prevalent in balancing out the tendency to universalize concepts such as “democracy” and “human rights” that are predominantly viewed as products of the liberal West. The Huntington thesis claims that many East Asian countries will resist the West’s effort to export democracy and universal human rights, and instead establish authoritarian regimes that produce societal order and a healthy economy.

Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s cited Confucian cultural traditions as a justification for non-democratic governments,

The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy. (1994; also see Emmerson 1995)

The argument for a distinct style of political relations in East Asia is based on the ideal-type description of Asian versus Western society. According to “Asian values” proponents, because of Confucian traditions, East Asian societies are paternalistic, duty-based and community-oriented, characteristics that promote harmony and consensus, while Western societies are rights-based and individualistic, which is congruent with the competitive elements of democratic competition (Lau and Kuan 1988; Rozman 1991). Moreover, similar descriptions of the Confucian cultural heritage are a well-established theme in the political culture literature on the region. Lucian Pye (1985) argued that these social values produce an allegiance to authority that appears inconsistent with democratic norms. Robert Scalapino (1989) similarly stressed the limited potential for democratic development in East Asia because of cultural traditions that emphasized communalism with limited toleration for opposition groups. Fukuyama (1995a: 27) saw Confucian social orientations as undercutting the social capital and interpersonal trust that is widely linked to democratic politics. Perhaps the strongest statement comes from Yung-Myung Kim (1997:1125) who states, “Confucian ideas are antithetical to Anglo-American democracy”.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast, other scholars have questioned the premises underlying the Asian values hypothesis. For instance, Larry Diamond’s (1988: 14-18) review of the political culture of the region emphasized the variability of cultural traditions, and the richness of these cultures enables them to be selectively interpreted to encourage or discourage democracy. Friedman (1994) is even more direct in stressing the cultural diversity of East Asia, and the ability of democratic norms to take root in many different types of cultural traditions. Another viewpoint holds that Asian values may help an individual expand social networks and accumulate social capital—

which are normally seen as beneficial to democracy. Asian values also promote social harmony, which may even be complementary to democracy in correcting its problems (Fukuyama 1995b).

Social modernization in East Asia, moreover, may transform social and political norms. With modernization comes urbanization, the breaking up of traditional social networks, and the spreading of competitive mentality, some of the factors contributing to the growth of individualism in Asia. Flanagan and Lee (2000; 1991), for example, demonstrated that social modernization variables were strongly related to support for more libertarian (less authoritarian) values in Japan and Korea. Thus, modernization may erode the very values and life styles that create the norms encapsulated in "Asian values".

In addition, national conditions and histories vary widely across East Asia, which raises the question of whether there is a single East Asian culture. Although most of the region is linked to Confucian cultural traditions, this is certainly not universal. Indonesians are overwhelmingly Islamic, and Philippines are disproportionately Catholic. The Communists in China and Vietnam once shunned Confucianism. Furthermore, for centuries, other philosophies such as Taoism and Buddhism have been interwoven into fabric of East Asian common life and traditions as well. And even Pye (1985) acknowledged that adherence to Confucianism varies greatly across the nations linked to this tradition. Thus, it is problematic to talk of a single East Asia political culture or philosophy that reaches from Japan to Singapore.

The dialectical conversation between the East and the West often stops at this point, recognizing both views but offering virtually no explanatory power for either side of the debate. We suggest that it might be useful to re-cast the debate in the framework of Harry Eckstein's congruence theory. In essence, congruence theory holds that political systems tend to be based on authority patterns that are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society

(Eckstein 1998). For instance, the hierarchic and paternalistic authority structures of the German family and society life in Weimar and the Wilhelmine Empire were more congruent with the political norms of the Kaiserreich than democracy under the Weimar Republic (Verba 1965). Putnam's (1993) analysis of political development in Italy is another reflection of congruence theory: political structures reflect the norms of social relations in the society that they govern. Inglehart's (1997; 2000) analyses linking self-actualizing values and democratic development is another example of congruence theory. Many of these same arguments are made for the impact of cultural traditions in East Asia; Confucian traditions are seen as more congruent with authoritarian political structures (Emmerson 1995; Rozman 1991; Scalapino 1989).

Thus we have a two-step research goal. First, we use the World Values Survey to assess the support for hierarchical, authority relations in family and other social relations. Indeed, what has been strikingly absent from elite debates about the political culture in Asia is empirical evidence on how the citizens themselves describe their orientations toward authority. Then, we consider whether these orientations are linked to the public's support for democracy. These analyses thus address both sides of the Asian values debate and provide broader evidence on congruence theory as applied to the East Asian experience.

### **Orientations toward Authority**

This research is based upon seven East Asian nations and four Western democratic countries that participated in either the 1995-98 or 2000-02 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS).<sup>2</sup> We examine all the surveys from East Asia: China, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam as the East Asian set. Scholars such as Lucian Pye (1985) classify most of these countries as having significant Confucian influences; thus, it is reasonable to

expect evidence of strong attachment to the concept of “Asian values” in most of these nations. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States are established Western democracies that provide a necessary benchmark for comparing political culture in East Asia to the Western condition. The WVS questionnaire taps a wide range of human values that are related to the theme of social and political modernization. For the purpose of this research, we focus on authority orientations first, and then citizen attitudes toward democracy.

There is a long tradition of empirical research on attitudes toward authority within Western societies that often begins with questions about the compatibility of these orientations and democratic commitments (Adorno et al. 1950; Milgram 1974). One goal of the World Values Survey was to tap such orientations (e.g., Nevitte 1996), so we are fortunate that a variety of different questions ask about authority in different life domains.

One set of questions focuses on family relations and orientations toward one's parents. Numerous authors have claimed that familism is one of the foundations of Asian cultural traditions (Yang 1988; Lau and Kuan 1988; Pye 1985). The survey asked respondents whether one should always love and respect one's parents regardless of their faults, whether it is the parents' duty to do what is best for their children, and whether one of the main goals in life is to make one's parents proud.<sup>3</sup> Table 1 presents the responses to these questions across our set of nations. If one treats the Western democracies as a control group, then respect for parents and allegiance toward one's parents are surprisingly strong among Western publics. For instance, 78% of Americans and 79% of Canadians say that one's parents should be respected regardless of their faults. Japanese sentiments are actually less deferential to parents than the Western average (73%). Respect for parents is somewhat stronger in other East Asian nations: 91% in Taiwan, 94% in Singapore and South Korea, and 99% in Vietnam. Parental respect is also



relatively high in the two East Asian nations without Confucian heritage: 95% in the Philippines and 90% in Indonesia.

The item on parental respect shows some variation across nations, but virtually no systematic difference between East Asian nations and Western democracies. The other item asks whether one's main life goals is to make your parents proud; positive responses average only slightly higher among the East Asian publics. On the whole, one would conclude that respect for parental authority is important in both cultural regions. The difference between the two regions averaged across these three parental questions is about a six percent gap.

=== Table 1 goes about here ===

Other questions examined orientations toward authority outside of the parental relationship: belief that child rearing should emphasize obedience, one should follow instructions of superiors at work even if one disagrees, and a desire for greater respect for authority in the society. The bottom panel of Table 1 displays the percentage giving positive responses toward authority on each of these items. When one moves outside of the family, the overlap in sentiments across the East/West divide is even more apparent. For instance, 35% of Americans and 31% of Canadians mentioned obedience as a value that parents should instill in their children--and the average across the eight East Asian nations is 36%. There is more variation in these opinions among East Asian nations, rather than between East and West.

The other items in the table also do not follow a clear East/West division. Agreement with the statement that one should follow a superior's instructions at work even if one disagrees averages slightly higher among the established Western democracies. None of the East Asian publics is more likely than Americans to say that one should follow instructions at work. In addition, beliefs that society should give greater respect to authority are generally much higher

among the established Western democracies than in the East Asian nations. The infrequent calls for more respect for authority in Japan (7%), South Korea (16%) and Taiwan (46%) may be because people believe that authority already garners too much respect in these nations' traditional cultures--but we note that other questions fail to demonstrate such strong orientations toward authority in these same nations.

Beyond the individual questions, these separate items seem to tap a common dimension of respect for authority. Our confirmatory factor analyses find a single dimension underlying these items (also see Flanagan and Lee 2000).<sup>4</sup> Thus, we created an additive index measuring support for authority with the six questions included in the World Values Survey.<sup>5</sup> All three of the Western democracies with full data have more than half the public with high scores on this index (i.e., agreeing with four or more authority items out of six): United States, 71%, Canada 66%, and Australia 57%. In comparison, Indonesia (61%), Singapore (69%), and Vietnam (86%) have a majority with high scores, and only minorities hold these views in Japan (7%), South Korea (16%), the PRC (35%), and Taiwan (36%). The ironic interpretation of these data is to ask whether strong orientations toward social authority structures are a handicap to democratic political values within Western democracies.

Thus, this initial empirical evidence already yields one striking finding: acceptance of authority is not sharply different between these East Asian nations and a set of established Western democracies around the Pacific Rim.<sup>6</sup> This finding runs counter to most of the historical qualitative research, which claims that respect for authority is greater in these East Asian societies. And using the cross-national breadth of the WVS, we demonstrate that the level of authority relations in East Asian nations is not substantially different from authority orientations found in Western democracies.<sup>7</sup>

The new wave of public opinion surveys that are emerging from East Asia generally support the findings presented here. For example, Ahn and Kang (2003) included three items on individualist versus collective orientations. They concluded, “South Koreans are evenly divided between individualism and collective orientations” (2003). Flanagan and Lee (2000) previously described authority relations in Japan and Korea using data from earlier waves of the WVS. They found these two publics were nearly evenly divided in terms of their libertarian versus authoritarian orientations. And preliminary analyses of familial authority questions from the East Asian Barometer finds that questions on family hierarch and family loyalty "are rejected by over three-fifths of the respondents in the average Asian country" (Chu 2003; Nathan 2003: 9).

There are several possible explanations for our findings and the contrast to earlier cultural studies of East Asia. Most of these East Asian nations have experienced a considerable process of social modernization during the later 20<sup>th</sup> century, in which many of these traditional cultural traditions may have become attenuated with increasing social and geographic mobility, and the move from rural to urban lifestyles (Flanagan and Lee 2000; 1991). This might apply especially to the non-family aspects of authority orientations, where opinions overlapped the most between East and West. While we expect that long-term timeseries, such as those dating back to the 1950s or 1960s, might display such trends—they are not apparent in those nations where the WVS has been asked over the past two decades. Data from the early 1980s is available for Japan and Korea, and these display little change in authority orientations until the present.<sup>8</sup>

Another explanation is that the stereotypes of previous descriptive studies of East Asian political culture were overdrawn, or based on socially observed behavior rather than personal attitudes and values that are internal to the individual. Admittedly, the social traditions in many East Asian nations place a priority on parents and a sense of duty that is seen as exceptionally

strong by Western observers and experts of the region (as noted in our literature review). But social customs are the same as individual beliefs. Rituals of ancestor devotion can be as ceremonial as a Western Christian who goes to church each Sunday even while doubting core teachings of the church. Moreover, excessive ritual may cause counter-reactions, as apparently is seen in the Japanese rejection of the need for greater respect for authority.

In summary, recent empirical evidence--our findings and those of other recent surveys--suggests that past descriptive characterizations of the pattern of authority relations held by people in East Asia are not reflected in current public opinion. While a nation's historical traditions may shape orientations toward authority, there does not appear to be a sharp East/West clash of values in this domain as some scholars have previously argued.

### **Testing Congruence Theory**

The culmination of our analysis examines the link between social authority orientations and support for a democratic regime. If authority relations in the family, workplace and social life are a basis of political orientations, as congruence theory would imply, then we expect that acceptance of parental and hierarchic authority patterns would not be a fertile basis for democratic values.

To test this hypothesis, we measured support for democracy with the "Democratic Regime Index" presented in Chapter 2.<sup>9</sup> The index is based on a battery of items from the WVS that measures support for democracy indirectly, not by asking about democracy exclusively, but by assessing orientations toward non-democratic political regimes. The question asked agreement with the following items:

- 1) *Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections;*

2) *Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country;*

3) *Having the army rule;* and

4) *Having a democratic political system.*

Pro-democratic responses are defined as disagreeing with the first three items and agreeing with the fourth. Additional information on this index and the cross-national distribution of opinions is available in Chapter 2.

We begin with the bivariate relationships between our six measures of authority relations and the democratic orientations index (Table 2). In the advanced industrial democracies there is normally a modest, albeit statistically significant, relationship between authority patterns and democratic values. For instance, Americans who say that parents should always be respected are somewhat less likely to endorse democracy over authoritarian political regimes ( $r = -.10$ ). The same pattern appears for the "make parents proud" item for the advanced industrial democracies.

This pattern does not carry over to the East Asian nations in our study, however. Some nations display a positive relationship and some a negative relationship, and the overall average is close to a null relationship. A notable anomaly is Vietnam, where respect for authority often is positively related to support for democracy. Even we use a different democracy index in Vietnam, we do not believe this is the explanation for this anomaly, since the two indices are positively correlated in the other nations where both were asked.

The same general pattern applies for the three other authority questions in the lower half of the table. Those who mentioned obedience as a trait parents should emphasize to their children are significantly less likely to endorse democratic values among the advanced industrial democracies. Among the nations of East Asia--including Japan--this relationship is essentially

non-existent. The only item that shows a pattern of strong congruence in East Asia is the question on greater respect for authority--though we noted earlier that few respondents in the nations where this relationship is strongest actually subscribe to these beliefs (see Table 1 above).

The final bit of evidence comes from the combined respect for authority scale in the last row of the table. Again, the relationships are generally stronger in Western democracies (average  $r = -.14$ )--consistent with congruence theory (although these relationships are not large). The average correlation is substantially weaker among the East Asian nations. Even if one excludes Vietnam because of its anomalous pattern, the average correlation is only  $-.09$  in the other six Asian nations.<sup>10</sup>

These weak relationships are significant because they contradict the widely claimed--but seldom tested--thesis that Confucian traditions and resulting authority orientations in East Asia will undermine the development of democratic values. It is true that deference toward authority has a negative impact within advanced industrial democracies, which is one reason this thesis developed in the political culture research literature. But the same pattern is not apparent in East Asia. This is not because variance is restricted on either the dependent or the independent variables, since similar distributions exist in West and East. And it is not a function of a single question or two, since the pattern is generally consistent across the multiple indicators in Table 2. It may be that such a linkage exists, but it is more complex than the direct relationship hypothesized in prior research. Indeed, the absence of a systematic relationship in the East Asian nations suggests that there are contrasting elements of Asian culture that may have counterbalancing effects, such as the emphasis on community and collective values (e.g., Fukuyama 1995b).

## **Multivariate Analyses**

The bivariate correlations provide initial tests for the relationship between “Asian values” and political culture. But before concluding that orientations toward authority are without strong effects, we want to consider whether these relationships are affected by other factors that influence democratic values. For instance, the dramatic social modernization in East Asia may be shifting opinions, and this may appear in age or social status differences that are related to authority orientations. Alternatively, other established predictors of support for democracy, such as social trust, might have confounding influences on these relationships. And across such a wide range of regimes, the role of financial or policy satisfaction also might affect these relationships.

To test for such effects, we included the index of authority relations with a set of other variables in a multivariate model predicting support for a democratic regime (Table 3).<sup>11</sup> Education and political discussion were included to see if sophisticated and involved citizens were more supportive of democracy. A measure of financial satisfaction taps whether immediate economic performance is related to support for a democratic regime. Social trust is based on Putnam’s (1993) analyses of the basis of democracy in the West. We also added age to see if there are generational patterns in these attitudes (also see Chapter \_ by Ong).

In each nation except Vietnam, the impact of authority orientations runs in the expected direction. But in most nations the impact of authority orientations is quite modest, far short of the cultural determinism that is implied by the Asian values thesis. Among the Western nations, the impact of authority relations weakens slightly in the multivariate model, and is now outweighed by other predictors such as education, age, or political engagement. Among the East

Asian nations, authority relations now exert a significant effect; the other predictors do not attenuate this relationship because they are only weakly related to support for democracy.

Moreover, the Vietnam survey shows the same pattern as the bivariate relationship, with authority patterns positively related to support for a democratic regime (see Table 1 above).<sup>12</sup>

The Confucian constellation of China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam thus do not speak in unison about the relationship, if any, between social authority orientations and democratic values. The weak relationships between authority patterns in the Asian family and support for democracy contradicts the skeptical view that democracy may not be able to take root in Asia, particularly within countries strong in Confucian traditions. The democratic potential of these nations should be judged by other factors than the social relationship between parents and their children.

### **Conclusion**

The findings from our research should, at the least, encourage a re-examination of the “Asian values” thesis, which claims that social authority relations are a significant impediment to democratization in Asia. The cultural explanation for the place of Asia and, more specifically, countries with a Confucian tradition, in current history seems to be much weaker when viewed from the evidence in public opinion surveys. We found that national levels authority orientations within East Asia are not strongly linked to Confucian heritage (comparing the Catholic Philippines and Islamic Indonesia to the Confucian nations in our survey), and not markedly different from the Western democracies of the Pacific Rim.

For countries with a history of political authoritarianism, a habit of thinking that the culture impeded democratization was probably built into scholars’ perception of East Asia. This deterministic mode of thinking might have arisen from the fallacious generalization from the



observable actions of authoritarian elites and social traditions, to presuming that these patterns represented the values of the citizenry. People in authoritarian countries, however, do not necessarily hold beliefs consistent with what their leaders value. In fact, individual citizens of such countries may not conform to what their rulers say they should. Or, previous generalizations about the political culture of East Asia may have been true in the past, but have changed with the social modernization in the region during the late 20<sup>th</sup> century (Flanagan and Lee 2000; 2003). In either case, the evidence presented here and other recent public opinion surveys raises basic questions about whether descriptive stereotypes of Confucian cultural traditions that form the basis of the Asian values argument are applicable to East Asian publics.

Our results also raise questions about treating all of East Asia as adhering to a single model of “Asian values.” The nations of the region differ widely in their economic condition and their political histories. East Asia spans the range from Vietnam to Japan, from South Korea to Indonesia and the Philippines—these are much different nations, with different social, religious, and political traditions. The citizens also differ significantly in their support for different elements of what has been described as Confucian traditions toward family and authority. Other philosophies, such as Taoism and Buddhism, are also interwoven into fabric of East Asian common life and traditions; and contemporary regimes have responded differently in accepting or impeding these traditions. At least in terms of the authority orientations examined in this paper, there is not a single East Asian political culture. Diverse value patterns exist across the publics of these nations.

Moreover, the current findings challenge one of the seminal theories in political culture theory as applied to East Asia (Eckstein 1998). Tests of the authority relations hypothesis show only weak evidence of a link between authority relations within the family or the workplace and

attitudes toward democracy. The non-significant findings and small correlations are some of the preliminary evidence that there may not necessarily be congruence between social and political entities. Those who support a democratic regime do not have to defy traditional authority relations within the family or in the workplace. Therefore, prospects for modernization might not be incompatible with a certain family or workplace culture. In other words, orientations toward democratization within an individual's set of values and a nation's policy agenda, respectively, do not have to create dissonance and tension with the non-political, private spheres.

We do not see this research as disconfirming the impact of political culture on the political process. Indeed, other research from the World Values Survey project underscores the importance of cultural influences on democracy (see the chapter by Inglehart and Welzel). Rather, the results raise questions about one aspect of political culture research that claimed social authority relations had a direct and strong impact on political norms. Such a relationship may exist in some settings, as the stronger relationships for Western democracies suggest. But there are a variety of social models that political norms may draw upon, and it is not necessarily the case that orientations towards one parents provides the model for how individuals think about governments.

The results from our analyses suggest, perhaps, a different way to conceptualize congruence among the elements discussed. Instead of a linear or dichotomous idea that sets of values either stay put or change, it may be more realistic to view social and political values as complex and non-linear in their interactions. Individuals' orientations toward democracy may not share the same sphere or have a direct linear relationship with filial piety toward one's parents or the values one wants to cultivate in children. Or the relationship between pro-democratic beliefs and non-political attitudes may dependent on the situational context. Testing

the latter case may involve more specific questions dealing with social and political circumstances that are beyond the scope of the World Values Survey.

Diverse values exist among citizens in East Asia. This observation may be one of the most optimistic and liberating views for democratic prospects that need to be further researched. Our initial findings provide some evidence toward the possibility of democratization without having to change the cultural traditions of the region. The speed of democratization will inevitably be faster than the slower pace of change in social relations or cultural traditions, but as long as no incongruence is perceived or the political is kept separate from the non-political spheres of values, then experiencing a cultural evolution will not have to be painful.

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**Table 1. Support for Authority by Nation**

| <b>Question</b>             | <b>Western Democracies</b> |            |           |            | <b>East Asian Nations</b> |           |            |            |             |             |            |           |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
|                             | <b>Aust.</b>               | <b>Can</b> | <b>NZ</b> | <b>USA</b> | <b>JPN</b>                | <b>SK</b> | <b>TWN</b> | <b>PHL</b> | <b>INDS</b> | <b>Sing</b> | <b>PRC</b> | <b>VN</b> |
| <u>Family Relations</u>     |                            |            |           |            |                           |           |            |            |             |             |            |           |
| Respect parents             | 74                         | 79         | 64        | 78         | 73                        | 94        | 91         | 95         | 90          | 94          | 85         | 99        |
| Parents duty                | 79                         | 82         | 71        | 85         | 46                        | 50        | 79         | 90         | 82          | 83          | 64         | 87        |
| Make parents proud          | 69                         | 82         | 58        | 79         | 56                        | 60        | 64         | 93         | 91          | 94          | 69         | 97        |
| <u>Other Social Domains</u> |                            |            |           |            |                           |           |            |            |             |             |            |           |
| Teach obedience             | 28                         | 35         | --        | 31         | 5                         | 14        | 33         | 44         | 53          | 47          | 35         | 56        |
| Work instructions           | 49                         | 58         | 35        | 66         | 29                        | 16        | 17         | 42         | 25          | 26          | 24         | 46        |
| Respect authority           | 73                         | 69         | 53        | 74         | 5                         | 16        | 46         | 72         | 37          | 53          | 49         | 80        |
| High on Index               | 57                         | 66         | --        | 71         | 7                         | 16        | 36         | 83         | 61          | 69          | 35         | 86        |

*Source:* 1995-98, 2000-02 World Values Surveys. Table entries are the percentage giving a response supportive of authority on each item; high

Scores on the authority relations index represent selecting four or more authority items on the six questions.

**Table 2. Correlations between Authority Orientations and Support for Democratic Regime**

|                               | <b>CAN</b> | <b>USA</b> | <b>NZ</b> | <b>OZ</b> | <i>West<br/>Avg</i> | <b>JPN</b> | <b>SK</b> | <b>TW</b> | <b>PHL</b> | <b>INS</b> | <b>Sing</b> | <b>PRC</b> | <b>VN</b> | <i>East<br/>Avg</i> |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Parental respect              | -.15*      | -.10*      | -.13*     | -.14*     | -.13                | -.03       | -.00      | -.09*     | .07*       | -.01       | .02         | -.07       | -.04      | -.02                |
| Parental duty                 | -.05       | .01        | -.01      | -.03      | -.02                | .05        | -.08*     | -.06      | .03        | -.03       | .00         | -.02       | .10*      | -.01                |
| Make parents Proud            | -.18*      | -.08*      | -.15*     | -.12*     | -.14                | -.03       | .02       | -.10*     | -.14*      | .04        | -.02        | -.02       | .01       | -.03                |
| Teach child obedience         | -.09*      | -.09*      | --        | -.13*     | -.10                | -.02       | -.06      | -.06      | -.02       | .01        | .02         | --         | -.03      | -.03                |
| Follow work Instructions      | -.04       | .01        | -.02      | -.06      | -.04                | -.01       | -.05      | .01       | .00        | -.09*      | -.10*       | -.03       | .04       | -.03                |
| General respect for authority | -.05       | -.02       | -.09*     | -.12*     | -.07                | -.19*      | -.14*     | -.11*     | -.03       | -.05       | -.14*       | -.08*      | .23*      | -.06                |
| Authority index               | -.15*      | -.09*      | -.14*     | -.18*     | -.14                | -.04       | -.10*     | -.17*     | -.04       | -.08*      | -.09        | -.05       | .12*      | -.06                |

Source: Combined surveys from the 1995-98 and 1999-2002 World Values Survey; \* means the Pearson's r is significant at 0.05 level.



**Table 3. Multivariate Analyses of Support for Democratic Regime**

|                               | <b>CAN</b> | <b>USA</b> | <b>NZ</b> | <b>OZ</b> | <b>JPN</b> | <b>SK</b> | <b>TW</b> | <b>PHL</b> | <b>INS</b> | <b>Sing</b> | <b>PRC</b> | <b>VN</b> |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|
| <b>Authority Index</b>        | -.10       | -.08       | -.13      | -.12      | -.08       | -.10      | -.14      | -.04       | -.07       | -.08        | -.04       | .11       |
| <b>Education</b>              | .14        | .09        | .08       | .12       | .12        | .09       | .07       | .09        | -.03       | .06         | .05        | .01       |
| <b>Age</b>                    | .17        | .18        | .09       | .12       | .16        | .06       | .05       | .03        | .01        | .15         | -.01       | -.03      |
| <b>Financial satisfaction</b> | -.01       | .00        | .11       | .01       | -.04       | .04       | -.05      | .01        | -.02       | -.02        | -.03       | .12       |
| <b>Social trust</b>           | .13        | .08        | .07       | .14       | .07        | .01       | .04       | .06        | .06        | .02         | --         | -.02      |
| <b>Discuss politics</b>       | .16        | .15        | .17       | .18       | .06        | .07       | .20       | .00        | .06        | .11         | .08        | .03       |
| <b>Multiple R</b>             | .30        | .30        | .29       | .36       | .21        | .16       | .28       | .12        | .11        | .19         | .12        | .18       |

*Note:* Table entries are standardized regression coefficients; pairwise deletion of missing data was used in these models.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> One could also note, however, that the other aspects of Confucian traditions appear more compatible with democracy. The emphasis on harmony and the responsibility of leadership, for instance, are consistent with classic democratic theory. Similarly, the value of the community also may be beneficial in developing a democratic culture. Thus, Fukuyama (1995b: 8) also notes that “there are fewer points of incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy than many people in Asia and the West believe”.

<sup>2</sup> We would like to thank Ronald Inglehart for inviting us to participate in the 2000-02 World Values Survey and for facilitating our access to these East Asian surveys. We also gratefully acknowledge our collegial relationship Pham Minh Hac and Pham Thanh Nghi of the Institute for Human Studies in Hanoi in the collection of the World Values Survey for Vietnam. Only the authors of this paper are responsible for the views expressed here.

<sup>3</sup> The questionnaire with the specific wording of items is available at: [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

<sup>4</sup> The six items were entered into a principal components analysis, and the following table presents the first unrotated dimension in each nation. The "teach obedience" question was not asked in New Zealand. Like Flanagan and Lee (2000) the results suggest a single dimension underlies these items, although we should note that in some instances the limited variance on items restricted the correlations; this is most clearly apparent in the Vietnamese results.

|                     | CAN  | USA  | Aust | NZ   | JPN  | SK   | TW   | PHL  | INS  | SING | PRC  | VN   |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Respect parents     | .63  | .63  | .67  | .69  | .50  | .35  | .56  | .76  | .33  | .46  | .57  | -.14 |
| Parent duty         | .31  | .36  | .34  | .53  | .46  | .67  | .61  | .77  | .62  | .64  | .63  | .40  |
| Parents proud       | .59  | .49  | .59  | .65  | .62  | .12  | .47  | .12  | .35  | .56  | .14  | .60  |
| Teach obedience     | .44  | .43  | .45  | --   | .32  | .47  | .46  | -.03 | .52  | .38  | .58  | -.22 |
| Follow instructions | .57  | .38  | .35  | .30  | .42  | .16  | .35  | -.14 | .49  | .25  | .36  | .56  |
| Respect authority   | .54  | .59  | .61  | .44  | .48  | .63  | .23  | .00  | .35  | .45  | .45  | .60  |
| Eigenvalue          | 1.65 | 1.45 | 1.61 | 1.47 | 1.35 | 1.24 | 1.31 | 1.21 | 1.26 | 1.35 | 1.41 | 1.26 |
| Percent variance    | 27.6 | 24.2 | 26.8 | 29.4 | 22.5 | 20.6 | 21.7 | 20.2 | 20.9 | 22.4 | 23.4 | 20.9 |

<sup>5</sup> The scale was computed as the simple sum of the approval of authority option on each of the six items. The scale thus runs from 0-6 in each nation, except in New Zealand where one item was not available.

<sup>6</sup> In a presentation of these data, a discussant claimed the questions were insufficient to tap attitudes toward authority in East Asia since they were derived from a survey first conducted in Europe. We disagree because we see these questions as broadly applicable across diverse national contexts, as was the intent of the World Values Survey. In addition, previous published studies of East Asia have interpreted these data as valid (e.g. Flanagan and Lee 2000; 1991); and other studies have compared East Asia to the West using some of these WVS items (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Flanagan 1982; Inglehart 1997; Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann. 2003).

<sup>7</sup> The four Western democracies examined here are not markedly different from the findings in Europe from the 1999 European Values Survey that included these same questions (Halman 2002).

<sup>8</sup> Three items were included with comparable wording over the four waves of the World Values Survey in Japan and Korea: respect parents, teach obedience, and respect for authority. The average

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giving the authority response across these three items had not changed significantly over this two decade time span:

|       | 1981 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|
| Japan | 28%  | 32   | 29   | 27   |
| Korea | 38   | 42   | 41   | 41   |

<sup>9</sup> The democratic regime index is not available for Vietnam, so the Vietnamese analyses are based on the democratic process index that is also described in Chapter 2.

<sup>10</sup> Other empirical evidence comes from the new East Asian Barometer. Albritton and Burekul (2004) find only a weak, non-significant relationship with a comparable measure of familial values and support for democracy in Thailand. In fact, the direction of the relationship is in the direction opposite to that predicted by theory.

<sup>11</sup> The regression models in Table 3 are not strictly identical across all ten nations. In about half the nations we used the "age left school" variable as a measure of education; in the other half we used a country-specific ranking of educational levels. The authority relations index lacked one item in New Zealand, the social trust variable was not included in the Chinese survey, and an alternative democracy scale was used in Vietnam as noted in footnote 7. For these reasons, we present standardized regression coefficients in the table. Comparing results where possible with the unstandardized coefficients yielded essentially similar results.

<sup>12</sup> Perhaps, the meaning of democracy for the Vietnamese is different than other East Asian countries. Like China, Vietnam has been experimenting with grassroots democracy, where the people contribute to policy-making at the local level. In these exercises, however, Vietnamese authorities always emphasize the importance of democratic practice within boundaries, meaning that the people should be aware of factors who try to "take advantage" of democracy and promote ideas harmful to societal structure and harmony. Hence, the value patterns shown in the analysis may indeed reflect governmental constraints.